Abstract
Introduction
In many high-technology industries, prodticts tend to form complex systems. Our case-study firm, Ericsson, operating in the cellular telephony industry, is a typical example. The products they sell include the development, production and installation of complete cellular telephone systems consisting of radio base stations, switches, etc. In their so-called 'Japan project', to be described below, management was confixmted with a veiy complex pitxluct development task, which involved coordinating the work of hundreids of participants. The development activities covered the generation of new knowledge, but also, to a great extent, the exploitation and re-combination of existing knowledge bases. These knowledge processes Many writers on product development point to the strategic importance of rapid product development, and efforts have been made to measure performance in ternis of development time (Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Imai et al. 1985; Stalk and Hout 1990) . Lead time is then treated as an outcome, i.e. a dependent variable. In our opinion, there should be more emphasis on the way deadlines and time-based controls are used; we treat them as independent variables affecting the outcome of the development process (see also Gersick 1988 Gersick , 1989 ). This is supported by the empirical studies of Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995), which indicate frequent milestones as important in accelerating product development. Below, we discuss deadlines and milestones as control mechanisms of a special kind and suggest that they may be used to promote cooperative efforts.
Methodology
The empirical basis of this article is a case study of a product development project within the Japanese Division of the Swedish firm, Ericsson Radio. In general, our study was guided by an ambition to combine the ideas of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) with those of reflexive interpretation, as discussed by Alvesson and SkSldbefg (1998) . Rather than applying a purely inductive or deductive methodology, we come close to the idea of abduction in pragmatist philosophy (Peirce 1940; Putnam 1995) . Accordingly, our study may be described as an iterative process in which we (a) try to identify patterns at the level of empirical regularities in a theoryinspired manner and (b) use these empirical findings to develop theory. The result of our study, taken as a whole, will then be a theoretical framework that 'explains' our case. Furthermore, we believe that our conceptual suggestions have a more general applicability, to be demonstrated in other project management contexts. Below, we describe the major 'empirical' and 'theoretical' phases of our iterative research process. The Japanese Division is organized as a matrix with multiple areas of responsibility. Somewhat simplified, our interviews covered (i) division management, (ii) functional line managers and (iii) managers/leaders at different levels in the project dimension of the matrix. In total we conducted more than thirty interviews, averaging two hours each, covering these various areas of responsibility. We also had access to internal, written material comprising nearly two thousand pages, and external information such as annual reports, press releases, etc. Taken together, we believe that our information-gathering activities have made it possible to get the kind of overview and in-depth picture of the project, and the respondents' view of the vital project processes, that should characterize a well-grounded case study (cf. Lincoln and Guba 1985) . In our study, we identify four major phases. In the initial phase, starting in late 1994, we were engaged in various preparatory activities for the project including a number of informal interviews with senior managers of Ericsson. Formally, our research project started with a three-hour meeting with the division manager in February I99S. The focus of thi.s niceiing wus on di.scussing the new project management principles applied in the first project carried out in this division. i.e. the project covered in uur study. The division manager carefully described the whole story of how the verv tough time schedule for the project made it necessary to abandon ihcir trdditional 'waterfall model' and develop a new philosophy, signilicil us the 'fountain model'. Based on our impres.sions during this predominantly inductive phase, including interviews and reading the main final rcpurt from the project and other secondary material, we were able to de.scribe the project's scope and context, and make a first interpretation of what tlie main features of the new project management philosophy were. We then conceived of the project mainly us a (successful) example of how to introduce the ideas of concurrent engineering in ;i practical project management context. In the second phase, we interviewed the project manager and the two sub-ordinate project leaders to find out the details of how the project was organized and carried out, what problems had appeared, etc. We also interviewed the line managers about their perspective on the project and how their functional departments were involved. At this point we became increasingly aware of the significance of using various arenas for interfunctional communication and the important role of the project matiagers. including their extensive use of milestones and deadlines. Managing a project, we concluded, was obviously not only a matter of making possible decentralized, creative communication and knowledge generation, but also u matter of maintaining control in relation to global goals. In the third phase of our study, we presented a 50-page draft, reflecting our view of the project, to the division manager and project manager. At this point, the theoretical ideas were still a bit fragmented, but we began to suspect that the two themes, i.e. the effects of deadlines on people und the issue of enabling multi-functional knowledge generation, were somehowconnected. Throughout the study, we returned to our respondetits to ask follow-up que.stions. to discuss transcribed interviews, and to sort out essential issues from these interviews. We also had access to all project management documentation on a continuous basis. At the end of this pha.se we interviewed the division manager and project manager separately to check the accuracy of the case description and to discuss our theoretical interpretations. Throughout the research process, our basic understandings of the type of projects we studied were inspired by decision theoretical ideas of how to manage and learn from experience in complex and ambiguous situations. During the fourth phase we tried to supplement and integrate these initial notions with recent writings in that part of the product development literature that is related to project management.
The Case Study
During the past decade, Ericsson has experienced an extremely rapid growth in the area of cellular telephony, which has made the company a leading producer and supplier of systems and radio base stations around the world. Its subsidiary, Ericsson Radio, has the tnain responsibility for the development, production and installation of the infrastructure of cellular telephony. During the late 80s, they were heavily occupied in developing such systems based on the digital standard for Europe (GSM) and the American market. Due to the resource demands of these investments, Ericsson, as late as 1990, kept a low profile on the Japanese market. However, as this market started to be de-regulated, top management decided to establish a subsidiary in Japan from which activities towards the newly established operators could be directed. To be able to defend its dominant position within this technology, it was considered to be of strategic importance to win a contract with one of the newly established operators in Japan. In late December 1991, Ericsson wrote a letter of intent with TDP (Tokyo Digital Phone), TDP, one of the subsidiaries of the Digital Phone Group, was expected to receive an operating license during 1994, The contracted system, including switches and radio base stations on site in Tokyo, was of great importance both for Ericsson and TDP. As the CEO of Ericsson expressed it: 'This breakthrough was of utmost strategic value for us at Ericsson, since Japan was the only large, impoitant market in the world where Ericsson was not present with its mobile telephone systems.'
In the contract negotiations, the representatives of the Japanese customer made it clear that they wanted the system installed and ready for commercial operation on 1 April 1994. "The customer said to us when we were discussing the details of the project that we had to come up with a better timetable. Otherwise they would consider choosing another supplier, probably one of our Japanese competitors. After some internal discussions we came to the conclusion that we must make it. We had to be able to get the system ready for commereial operation by 1 April 1994,' (Marketing Director) Management saw the order as a win or lose contract, where a successful project was expected to lead to many business transactions in the future, especially with other companies of the Digital Phone Group, The tough time schedule confronted the project management team with a difficult task. This, along with the establishment of the 'Japanese Division', which was to become the unit responsible for future activities in Japan, led to a couple of chaotic years between 1992 and 1994. When the contract was signed, there were only 25 individuals working on the Japan project. At the first thorough examination of the timetable, the management team approximated the amount of time available for the actual development work. It was clear that the customer needed two months for user friendly testing. By that time, the radio base stations and the whole system had to be tested and installed by the Ericsson people in .lupan. The division manager expressed it :is follows: 'We knew that the system test would take us at least two months. Moreover, the installation of the system and the radio base station would take at least three months. We had kind of lost seven months merely for installation and different testing activities on site in Tokyo. We knew that if we wen; supposed to install 147 radio base stations at different sites aroutid the city of Tokyo, they just had lo \vork pertedly fmm the start.' (Division Manager)
The total production of the radio base stations was to be carried out in Ericsson's production units in Sweden. The packaging of the system and radio base stations had to be done in a way that made them easy to unwrap and install on site in Tokyo.
'If we were supposed to ship all the equipment in August, we had to start production in June. Production takes time, which is often forgotten. We saw that we had only I i months for the development wotk. The first prototype of the radio base station had to be ready by I May 1993. I would not exaggerate if I said thai we were a bit worried at this point in time. One might say that we did not examine the contract and timetable thoroughly enough before the contract was signed. Twelve months for development work appears to be an impossible mission, especially if you have in mind that we were to build up a whole division at the same time.' (Division Manager)
To be able to meet the deadline, use had to be made of competence lirotTi development projects for the European and American markets. The division manager also declared that he wanted people who had learned from the mistake.s of earlier projects. All this led to a thorough examination of competence around the organization in order to decide upon which units should be engaged in developing and producing the Japanese system. These measures were, however, far from enough to make it possible to carry out the project in half the time of similar projects; the project had to be managed in a very different way compared to the earlier GSM project. By following their traditional sequential model, they would not be able to meet the deadline. After a lot of brainstorming activities and discussions, the project management team, encouraged by the division manager, came up with the idea of working more simultaneously and, in doing so. taking advantage of various lessons learned during earlier projects.
'There were a lot of us who had been working on the GSM project. We had a lot of ideas that came up pretty late in that project and we had no chance to implement them. In the Japan project we saw an opportunity to use our experience from the GSM project. We said if we could do this all over again it would be perfect. The problem was just that in the Japan project we had to do everything so much faster, in nearly half the time.' (Project Manager)
From Watertall to Fountain
The project model used in the earlier GSM project was called the 'waterfall model', a label also found in much project management literature. In this model, the different activities and parts of the project were sequentially ordered and sharply separated from each other by well-defined exit and entiy criteria. As a result, later stages or downstream activities cannot start until the exit conditions of earlier ones have been fulfilled. When such a decision is taken, the next (functional) unit takes over responsibility, a procedure well illustrated by the often invoked image of 'throwing things over the wall'. The new model was labelled the 'fountain model' by the managers. Unlike the 'waterfall' with water flowing sequentially, the 'fountain' image was one of water flowing simultaneously from many sources. Generally, such a model may be conceived as one relying on working in a more concurrent manner. As practiced at Ericsson, the main difference between the models lay in the way downstream teams were involved early in the project process. In fact, a basic idea behind the fountain model was to have much of the development and design work driven by downstream phases. In order to have all parts of the project start early, entry criteria were heavily downplayed if not abolished outright. Another salient characteristic was the emphasis on feedback information, generated by frequent milestones, practical tests of sub-parts and controls related to more informal 'promises'. Furthermore, these often took place in quite public settings. As a consequence, it was made more obvious how delays in one part of the project would affect the work in other parts, or even the pace of the whole project. Whereas in the 'waterfall' model, delays and mistakes in one functional unit or development stage could be treated as their 'internal' responsibilities, the 'fountain' model promoted communal responsibilities. Figure 1 is a stylized version of the one used in the Japanese Division to explain the 'fountain' model, clearly illustrates that entry criteria were downplayed and that the different units should start as soon as possible. For many of them, this meant that they had to be involved over a longer period than would have been the ca.se if the 'waterfall' model had been used. This did not, however, imply that these individual units were exposed 
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to fewer milestones, tests and controls during the process preceding the final, nearly simultaneous 'exit'. Indeed, as indicated above, ruther the contrary was true. It was also underlined that the 'fountain' model would require u more network-like organization, based on inter-functional integration and continuous dialogue.
'The traditional "waterfall model" for the design work cannot be followed. In order to shorten development time, the various tests within the objects must be overlapping. This requires tight communication between the sub-parts concemed within each object. Production preparation must, for example, be initiated at the same time as product design. Normally, such activity starts 10-18 months after design ha.s started. The parallel design approach also requires that the integration and verification phases must begin as soon as possible. Normally such activity begins 18-24 months after the start of product design.' (Technical Manager)
The new way of working also implied that failures had to be viewed differently.
'It is most important to realize that it is all a matter of doing right the iirst time. But it is just as important to realize that it will not work at once. What you need is the courage to fail, and never give up.' (Project Leader)
While the responsibility for many project activities and sub-parts of the product was clearly allocated to separate functional teams, the relations between the parts and the teams could not be specified entirely a priori.
The kinds of problems that would show up when integrating the pieces could not be anticipated. As a way of handling this problematic, the metaphor of 'practicing the processes' was used as an important guide. Arenas and Commui All this required arenas where infonnation could flow between the phases of the project. Management invented integrating mechanisms such as the 'systems emergency ward', which was to be a forum for problem solving and discussions of all kinds of issues in the project. In these meetings, during some periods held almost on a daily basis, eveiy member of the project could put a question on the agenda, whenever necessary. To be able to handle this new Way of working, managers and members of the project were certainly busy establishing communication channels and work models that cut across the organization. One of the project leaders formulated the philosophy in the following terms:
'You have to get people to understand parts other than their own. As an example, the designer wants functionality, whereas the production engineer wants a product suitable for production. The test engineer, on his part, wants a product that is easy to test. It is all about getting these people to work together and get a product that fits everybody.' (Project Leader)
Great efforts were put into information activities in the project. Management saw it as one of their most important tasks to inform the organization about the mission of getting Ericsson to Japan. Also, at technical levels, information had to flow rapidly.
'There was a constant need for information throughout the different phases of the project. For us in the project management team, it was a matter of organizing the information flow to create a fast and flexible project. For example, we used video and telephone conferences, project newsletters and short meetings which were often held daily. Moreover, the systems emergency ward was a forum where trouble reports were dealt with. In this forum, we had some of the most competent Ericsson people within this area. We could therefore respond very quickly and make fast decisions.' (Project Leader)
The atmosphere around the formation of the division and the execution of the project was very much affected by the importance of the undertaking. Everybody in the organization realized the importance of the project for the company, and knew that top management was following the project with a keen interest. When the first radio base stations were manufactured, the project management team organized a 'quality demonstration', which is one example of how processes were practiced.
'We ordered a radio base station from the warehouse. Everybody thought that it was destined for shipment to Japan. However, we arranged a quality demonstration in Stockholm and invited top management, quality managers, designers, etc. When we did this demonstration, it turned out that the product did not woik. There were all kinds of problems, such as mechanical problems, packaging problems, things were missing, and that created enormous attention. I think this was the first time that the designers had seen a complete radio ba.se station.' (Project Leader)
During the project, the deadline was very definitive and unambiguous. This provided the organization as a whole with a very clear goal -a fully operative system by 1 April. The core of the project management team was the project manager, who had experience from the GSM project, and two veiy experienced project leaders. An important task for the project leaders was to create a strong focus on the final deadline and the milestones.
'If we said that it was to be ready by Friday, we did not accept anything else. If it did not work, we hunted the person responsible for the delivery, no matter where he was. You have to get people to understand that next week is too late. Trying hard is not enough. It is only success that counts -nothing else.' (Project Leader)
One of the main problems that the two project leaders had to deal with was the trade-off between functionality and time. It was of great importance to have a system with radio base stations that was operative on the prescribed date, so to reach that goal reductions in the level of functionality of various parts had to be considered. A constant dialogue about what was 'gotxi enough' was thus needed. Generally, the emphasis on deadlines and milestones triggered such re-evaluations of optimal versus necessary functionality. Furthermore, the frequent tests and other controls created u sense ul' shared responsibility for vital sub-parts of the system and encouraged interfunctional dialogue and compromise.
'It is all a matter of focusing on the important parts. Topically, some engineers and designers tend to focus on the interesting parts.' (Division Managerl Finally, after more than two years of hard work, the system was installed and accepted for commercial operation by I April. The first step towards establishing the company in Japan had been successfully taken. Since the completion of the project under study. Ericsson has written additional contracts with the remaining companies within the Digital Phone Group and has also established long-term relationships with a couple of other new operators.
A Thoofwticfll lntAi|WÔ
rganizing activities in projects may generally be conceived as implying that these are decoupled firom the rest of the organization in much the same way as with decentralization and departmentalization efforts. Such an arrangement has the potential of simplifying a situation by cutting off relations and interactions to make it possible to handle existing problems within the limited cognitive abilities given to man (Levinthal and March 1993). Projects thus contribute to reducing, or perhaps often escaping, complexity and make action and learning firom experience possible. Buffered from the rest of the organization, learning in those circumstances will tend to be local. The traditional waterfall model is illustrative of this general principle. Such a project is partitioned into separate steps, each involving specialized functions. Hence buffers are created and local learning possibilities are reinforced.
Although generally conducive to efficiency and learning, such localness is not without dangers. As discussed extensively in Levinthal and March (1993) local learning tends to be myopic. According to them it may lead to all sorts of problems, such as over-simplified rigid mental maps of the individuals, too strong an involvement in specialized niches, learning limited to the spatial closeness of cunent actions, knowledge generation building only on what already exists, etc. In a changing environment, such learning becomes risky and the increased ability to exploit knowledge may drive out necessary processes of knowledge exploration. Looking at the specific form of project organization used by Ericsson in this case, we notice a departure from this traditional functional-sequential logic. Instead, their so-called 'fountain model', inspired by ideas of concurrent engineering, may be interpreted as a design that aims at eliminat-ing buffers which might conceal or delay signals of emerging problems. Whereas, in the 'waterfall model', feedback and learning will bie lockedin and separated stage-wise or limited to the transitional stages of exit-entry as described above, the 'fountain model' will produce feedback that is more global and continuous. In essence, the model represents an effort to make the project process more tightiy coupled. Contrary to a decoupled project logic of 'throwing it over the wall', the passing over of responsibility from one phase to another, the 'fountain' model downplays entry criteria to stimulate early starting, simultaneous, efforts in the different parts of the project and a sense of communal responsibility for the whole project. It also focuses peoples' attention on the relations between units and the participants involved and on the need for communication and interactive problem solving throughout the process. Moreover, various specific measures, such as putting up emergency wards, 'practicing organization' efforts, informal meetings, etc, provide arenas of interaction necessary for the model to work.
Why Fountsins?
Interpreting the 'fountain model' as related to tight coupling and global or holistic thinking raises the question as to why such a model, making learning more problematic, was chosen instead of' a more traditional sequential one or one relying more on clear 'work breakdown structures'. Before answering this question, a few things should be noted. One is the fact that time limits were so tight that there was simply no time to work according to a traditional, more stage-wise, development process. In order to manage the Japan project, it was thus necessary, somehow, to compress tiie time schedule considerably. Introducing a 'new model', a 'new language' etc. that is rather different from 'the old one' is then probably a good general management idea to promote a sense of novelty and a pioneering spirit. Another issue is that much development work in the project could, in fact, be allocated to separate teams that had worked with similar problems in earlier projects. While it is true that 'canned knowledge' could be 're-used' to a great extent, there was certainly major development and adaptation woiic to be done; in particular, the development of the new radio base station proved to be a much more challenging task than expected. The amount of work in this part of the project was seriously under-estimated, as was also the case with many other parts. So, while it was possible to identify what sub-units and what kind of experience were needed in the project, the complexities involved were obviously too great to allow a very realistic a priori calculation of the work needed to produce vital sub-parts. The great number of units and individuals participating in the project was probably an even more important source of complexity, and the main challenge was to get all the components, software as well as hardware, to function well together, to be reliable, manufacturable, transportable, etc. As several of the interviewees declared, in such a complex and unforeseeable process, 'doing things right the tirsl time is not possible', h'uilurcs will thtis be unavoidable, sitice no one can specify beforehand the outconu-oi' the complex interactions involved. Errors will then show up at tunclionul inter faces, when parts hx>m different unil.s have to be combined «ir lntcgraied. However, while these errors ure both numerous and hard to foresee, most ol° them are rather easily taken care of by the parties involved. Cdniniunal problem-solving activities, such as frequent testing of composiie parls oi whole systems, 'practicing organization', etc.. then become nalurul. Using a 'fountain model' with continuous, interactive problem solving thus seems lo be rathur logical in the context of systemic complexity. A development process that is u priori non-analyzable will not allow for ;i complete 'work breakdown' allocated to separate uniLs. Instead ol' frying to resolve all the uncertainty at the outset, this has to be done in it piecemeal fashion, where each new step will build on the experiences gained und the decisions taken in earlier stages. Further, as hypothesized by [.e\ inthal and March (1993) . a tightly coupled model would seem to have eflicienc) properties when .system-wide error detection rather ihan error diagnostics is the main issue. This theoretical e.vplanation seems litting in the case ot Eric.s.son'.s Japan project, where the complex combination or integration problematic is likely to produce many unforeseeable, but nither easily resolved problems. More fundamental diagnosis problems i-elateJ to base technology are not \er>' likely, due to Ericsson's long experieiue in ihis area.
A Typology of Project Logics
Our conception of the 'fountain model' as a coupling logic which is well suited for error detection in the context of systemic processes relies on a two-dimensional reasoning. Both of these contingency dimensions relate to important 'technological' aspects of the project context. One dimension distinguishes between development processes of a 'systemic' character and those that are 'analyzable*. Systemic processes then reter to situations where the relevant work activities and the causal relations and sequences between them are hard to specify a priori, due to severe and unforeseeable technical interdependencies, etc. Analyzable processes accordingly refer to situations where such a priori specifications are relatively easy to establish. As illustrated above, this dimension was useful in characterizing our empirical observations. Conceptually, it is quite similar to Perrow's (1970) division into analyzable versus non-analyzable technologies and the discussion about decomposable/non-decomposable dichotomy in Simon (1973) . As with the latter, it also resembles the kind of general design contingencies that differentiate between simple/complex, certain/uncertain situations or technologies, which are ubiquitous in organization theory. However, while such a choice is not a very original one, it must still be considered, as discussed in Eisenhaidt and Tabrizi (1995) . to be one of the most fundamental dimensions in the context of product development. In the other dimension, we build on Levinthal and March's (1993) distinction between 'error detection' and 'error diagnostics'. In error-detection situations, a low degree of technical-knowledge generation is required in order to handle each individual error. Instead, a primary problematic is to achieve a global or system-wide search for errors. Error diagnostics, on the other hand, point at project contexts involving more fundamental technological problem solving, where the detection of errors is a minor issue. The dimension of error problematics thus differentiates between project contexts that imply less knowledge depth from those where deep or specialized knowledge generation is required. Generally, we would dien expect error detection to be a common problematic in projects related to knowledge exploitation, while error diagnostics would typically be involved in projects aiming at the exploration of new possibilities (March 1991). As noticed above, the error dimension helped to 'explain' why a coupling logic was used in our case study project. The general focus on 'errors' also connects to the idea of bounded rationality (Simon 1976) , stressing the severely limited capacity of man compared to the complexity inherent in most organizational problem solving. This dimension thus underlines that errors are an unavoidable characteristic of most project work, whether analyzable or not, and that learning from experience is an important issue. Such a link between errors and learning is often emphasized in cognitive theories on learning (Dodgson 1993) and in the literature on organizational learning (Cohen and Sproull 1996; Ai;gyris and SchSn 1996). At a more practical level this may imply that {ex post) efforts to achieve frequent testing, fast feedback and other error handling routines should be preferred, in most cases, to (ex ante) efforts aiming at zero errors. Somewhat speculatively, we may then suggest the following grid in which the two case study models and two other possibilities are depicted as ideal typical project logics. Taking the four cells seriatim we first have a 'scheduling' type of project logic, where the analyzability of processes combined with a need for error detection should tum the project very much into an optimization endeavour. 
Semi-coupliug logic
In such a programmable context, project activities may be grouped into a complete 'work-breakdown structure' with well-established standards in terms of time, cost, functionality, etc. Errors or deviations from these standards are thus easily interpreted, turning the process into a 'measurement procedure" with little need for discussion and dialogue. In such a low complexity context, only 'trivial learning" would seem to be involved. In the second cell, relying on a 'coupling' logic, error detection is more complicated due to the systemic context producing many unforeseeable errors. Parallelling the discussions in Orton and Weick (1990) , the coupling concept is chosen here in order to stress the high degree of (inter-functional) responsiveness, while downplaying (functional) autonomy. 'If there is responsiveness without distinctiveness, the system is tightly coupled' (p. 205). Organizing in order to achieve responsiveness and error detection stresses the need for frequent or continuous communication between the various sub-groups or members in a project and setting up arenas where such formal and infonnal interaction may take place.
Maintaining tight coupling between sub-processes allows here for immediate responses and system-wide error detection. We might also expect some 'interface learning' to come about, where functional units learn about each other. In the context of such rapid and multi-functional problem solving, however, the chances of accomplishing 'deep' knowledge generation and learning will be meager. Apart from such in-project learning, it seems as though inter-project learning could also be important. Several of the interviewees, for example, saw the project management principles constituting the 'fountain model' as very much a result of learning from mistakes in earlier projects. Such learning and knowledge then reside in individuals and remain largely 'tacit' rather than becoming limily crystallized in impersonal guidelines (cf. Polanyi 1962) . According to project managers, transferring experiences and lessons learned from one project to another then becomes very much a matter of designing new projects by putting together -and re-using -individuals with suitable experience. For such personalized knowledge to become organizational, low turnover among such key personnel will be beneficial. Low turnover will mean an increase in the number of re-uses and will also make it possible to inlluence and develop the general project culture in the organization. If sub-processes are reasonably analyzable, a 'separating' logic may achieve error diagnosis. Such a logic, favouring autonomy or distinctiveness rather than responsiveness, generally recognizes the value of functional specialization and intra-functional problem solving. Cutting off or strictly regulating the unit's relations to other units obviously allows for a more focused and concentrated effort at solving a difficult and more clearly bounded problematic. Furthermore, due to the condition of analyzability, it is implicitly assumed that it will be possible to put together in a straightforward way the outcomes of the different specialized work groups. By decoupling or separating units that work sequentially or simultaneously, complexity is thus reduced and 'deep learning', although vulnerable to various myopia.
is made possible. In our opinion, such a logic minors quite well the classic 'waterfall' design of project organization. In the fourth cell we identify projects in which a logic of 'semi-coupling' prevails. Here the project process becomes problematic not only due to a multitude of complex interdependencies (as in the coupling context), but also because highly specialized functional knowledge bases are involved (as in the separating context). This seems to demand a project logic that simultaneously allows for coupling and separation or, in the words of Orton and Weick (1990), both distinctiveness and responsiveness. In such a project, knowledge is created cooperatively by semi-coupled, highly specialized individuals or units. This kind of structure may be expected to generate much variation and, hopefully, some 'radical innovations' (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Since most new ideas are probably bad ideas (March 1994: 38) , there are many risks and potential errors involved too. The things to be developed are new, i.e. not well known a priori, and one has to look for 'strategic errors', indicating that the whole project is moving in a wrong direction or dealing with unsolvable problems. In 'coupling' projects with relatively uncomplicated interface errors, a rapidly obtained consensus or compromise is a desirable outcome. Contrary to this, a 'semi-coupled' project would require that the degree of autonomy and heterogeneity among the parties remain substantial during the project. As discussed in Sitkin (1996) , actiori/feedback/adjustment cycles that are too rapid may lead to 'groupthink' (Janis 1972), 'escalating commitment' (Staw and Ross 1987) and other kinds of myopia. In such a context, fast learning has its liabilities (Levinthal and March 1981) and a fairly 'slow' learning process should be preferred. Obviously we cannot rely here on a 'measurement procedure' characteristic of the 'scheduling' logic. Since errors and deviations are highly ambiguous, a continuing dialogue and enough time for reflective activity will be necessary.
Deadlines and Time-based Controis
A salient feature of the Japan project was the active use of deadlines and milestones. The ultimate deadline was communicated in an unambiguous way, leaving no room for negotiation or compromise. There were also many factors which contributed to its legitimacy and authority. P&ople knew that this project was of strategic importance and that failure would have severe consequences. Moreover, the managers clearly signalled a very high involvement in the project. Apart from this overall project deadline and various milestones related to it, there were also many regular meetings and arenas where specialists from different functional units would meet. A large number of these, such as 'quality demonstrations' and 'practical tests' of sub-parts of the cellular telephone system, were important, not only as general fora for solving problems of a communal character, but also in pacing the project within the given time constraints. In our view, these occasions were also integral parts of the same time-based control system. is available to what is required and then make a decision us to whether they will participate fully, or not at all. It is suggested that this process proceeds in a manner that conserves energy by retaining only such problems that have attracted participants willing to expend substantial energy. Such a concentration of attention will also create better preconditions for feedback processes and contribute to a competence multiplier effect. Instead of having the four independent streams as described above, these an.* now more intertwined, presumably leading to u stronger goal orientation and attention focus than in the pure model. The risk exposure of the individual is then changed. The individual will no longer have the opportunity to uct like an option collector. Instead, individual behaviour will be similar to thut of an ordinary shareholder who will have to commit himself to the entire risk spectrum, with equal weight on upside and downside risks. In Weiner, a deadline is depicted very much as a random garbage-ejection mechanism, with garbage thrown away without much consideration or reflection. In a similar vein. Levinthal and Mareh (1993) note that, especially when response time is short, people will be unconcerned to draw from repertoires used earlier, from stockpiled knowledge, etc. as long as solutions meet the limits. As discussed in Sowell (1980: 16) . there ure also risks of desperate efforts being made just before a deadline, i.e. behaviour that is 'tailored to the time period in question, without regard td its longer range implications'. The so-called Brooks' law, stating that 'adding manpower to a late software project makes it later' (Brooks 1995: 25) clearly illustrates that such deadline-induced behaviour may be counter-productive. However, as indicated earlier, deadlines may not always prcxluce such random or perverse processes. As illustrated in our case study, deadlines and milestones were very much relied upon a.s a means of keeping track of progress towards the final, very definitive, deadline. Moreover, u multitude of other time-based controls were being used throughout the development process. Many of these, such as those connected to practical tests of composite sub-parts, encouraged an increased inter-functional responsiveness and a sense of shared responsibility among those involved. They also triggered communal re-evaluations and the need to agree on necessary compromises -faced with the approaching deadline. In projects organized in a parallel rather than a sequential fashion, deadlines and related time-controls thus appear to have the potential to function as a 'globalizing' mechanism preventing people and organizations from being guided by overiy local and atomistic perspectives. Contrary to structuring mechanisms such as roles and routines that tend to economize on individuals' reflective capacity, deadlines tend to encourage reflective activity. While these former mechanisms often signal what others expect or want you to do, deadlines tell you to think for yourself. This indicates that deadlines, if used in a sensible manner, may even constitute an 'unobtrusive' form of control that can be aligned with the ideas of decentralization, autonomy and self-organization often invoked in the literature on knowledge management and concurrent engineering (cf. Nonaka 1994: Wheelwright and Clark 1992).
Conclusions
In their Japan project, Ericsson had to accept a very tight deadline, signified by the managers as an 'impossible mission' task. Confronted with this situation, they had to abandon their traditional, sequential way of working, and invented the so-called 'fountain' model, which relied to a greater extent on parallel work. In doing so, they managed to considerably shorten leadtime and deliver the cellular telephone system on time. In the empirical sections, we have outlined the central principles of their new model, often in comparison with a sequential one, and tried to show the significance and impact on people of using various arenas and interaction practices. In our theoretical discussion of these issues, we have tried to connect the ideas of decision theory and those related to the management of product development projects. As a result, we interpret the fountain model as representing a coupling logic suitable for error detection in a systemic context. We also propose a model, identifying four different logics of project organization, that may be used contingent upon the type of error problematic and complexity that are involved. Based on our case study observations we suggest that the use of deadlines, milestones and other time-based controls, not only helps to pace the entire project in relation to its overall time limits, but also supports parallel project work by encouraging inter-functional communication and reflection. Using the gaibage-can metaphor, we finally dig somewhat further into the issue of deadlines and other time-based controls and uncover some of their functions as 'globalizing' mechanisms with the potential to produce rationalistic breaks and prevent overly routinized or localized behaviour. Such an interpretation emphasizes their role as a means to get rid of gaibagecan behaviour where it is unwanted or disfimctional.
